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Abstract: 
Autobiographical accounts and a limited research literature suggest that 
adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) can experience difficulties with 
decision-making.  We examined whether some of the difficulties they 
describe corr spond to quantifiable differences in decision-making when 
compared to adults in the general population.    The participants (38 
intellectually able adults with ASD and 40 neurotypical adults) were 
assessed on three tasks of decision-making (Iowa Gambling Task, 
Cambridge Gamble Task, and Information Sampling Task), which 
quantified, respectively: decision-making performance, relative attention to 
negative and positive outcomes, speed, flexibility, and information 
sampling.  As a caution, all analyses were repeated with a subset of 
participants (nASD=29 and nneurotypical=39) who were not taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication. Compared to the neurotypical 
participants, participants with ASD demonstrated slower decision-making, 
and superior performance on the Iowa Gambling Task. When those taking 
the medications were excluded, participants with ASD also sampled more 
information. There were no other differences between the groups.  These 
processing tendencies may contribute to the difficulties self-reported in 
some contexts; however, the results also highlight strengths in ASD, such 
as a more logical approach to, and care in decision-making.  The findings 
lead to recommendations for how adults with ASD may be better supported 
with decision-making. 
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Understanding self-reported difficulties in decision-making by people with autism 
spectrum disorder 
 
Abstract 
Autobiographical accounts and a limited research literature suggest that adults with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) can experience difficulties with decision-making.  We 
examined whether some of the difficulties they describe correspond to quantifiable 
differences in decision-making when compared to adults in the general population.    
The participants (38 intellectually able adults with ASD and 40 neurotypical adults) 
were assessed on three tasks of decision-making (Iowa Gambling Task, Cambridge 
Gamble Task, and Information Sampling Task), which quantified, respectively: 
decision-making performance, relative attention to negative and positive outcomes, 
speed, flexibility, and information sampling.  As a caution, all analyses were repeated 
with a subset of participants (nASD=29 and nneurotypical=39) who were not taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication. Compared to the neurotypical participants, 
participants with ASD demonstrated slower decision-making, and superior performance 
on the Iowa Gambling Task. When those taking the medications were excluded, 
participants with ASD also sampled more information. There were no other differences 
between the groups.  These processing tendencies may contribute to the difficulties self-
reported in some contexts; however, the results also highlight strengths in ASD, such as 
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a more logical approach to, and care in decision-making.  The findings lead to 
recommendations for how adults with ASD may be better supported with decision-
making.   
 
Keywords 
Autism spectrum, decision-making, Iowa Gambling Task, Cambridge Gamble Task, 
Information Sampling Task  
 
Background 
Decision-making is a complex mental process, through which one of two or more 
possible options or actions is actively selected in order to reach a desired goal (Edwards, 
1954; Huitt, 1992).  People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) report experiencing 
difficulties with certain features of decision-making more frequently than those without 
the condition (Luke, Clare, Ring et al., 2012), and a small number of studies have 
evidenced atypical responses on standard decision-making paradigms (e.g. Johnson, 
Yechiam, Murphy et al., 2006).  However, it is still the case that relatively little 
information is available about the ways in which the decision-making of adults with 
ASD may be affected by the condition. This does not make it easy to make 
recommendations about how best to provide support. 
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The paucity of research in this area is surprising given the indication from a variety of 
sources that, even for intellectually able and articulate people with ASD, decision-
making can be difficult. Autobiographical accounts, for example, describe how, for 
some people, the decision-making process can become ‘locked up and overloaded with 
pictures coming in all at once’ (Grandin, 2000, p2), and how having to choose ‘on the 
spot’ can be very difficult for children with ASD (Sainsbury, 2000, p101).  These 
accounts are consistent with a teacher’s observation of delays in decision-making by 
children with Asperger syndrome (AS) (Winter, 2003), and parental perceptions of 
indecisiveness in young adults with AS (Johnson et al., 2006).  Moreover, recent self-
report data suggests that people with ASD frequently experience a number of 
difficulties in decision-making, including mental ‘freezing’, anxiety, exhaustion, 
slowness in reaching decisions, a tendency to collect  too much information, and 
impaired flexibility, such as making decisions on the basis of previous choices (Luke, 
2011; Luke et al., 2012).   
 
In addition, there is a limited research literature suggesting, indirectly, that decision-
making may be affected by the neuropsychological differences implicated in ASD.  
These include impairments in executive functions (for review, see Hill, 2004), which 
are associated, in other clinical conditions, with impaired decision-making (e.g. Manes, 
Sahakian, Clark et al., 2002; Marson, Chatterjee, Ingram et al., 1996), and high levels of 
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anxiety (Gillott, Furniss and Walter, 2001). Such difficulties can restrict the ability to 
think abstractly (Etzioni, 1988) and disturb the normal patterns of autonomic arousal 
present in decision-making (Miu, Heilman and Houser, 2008). 
 
Finally, a small number of laboratory studies involving non-social tasks have 
investigated decision-making in ASD.  The earliest of these (Johnson et al., 2006) used 
a version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio et al., 1999) to 
assess decision-making in ambiguous situations.  Compared to a neurotypical 
comparison group, participants (n=15), adolescents with AS (n=14) demonstrated a 
more erratic pattern of choices, which could result in disadvantageous decision-making 
(Yechiam, Busemeyer, Stout et al., 2005).  In addition, using a mathematical model, the 
Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002), Yechiam and 
his colleagues the study also found a non-significant trend for participants with AS to 
attend more to negative than positive outcomes of previous choices.  The authors 
proposed that this was caused by a sub-group of individuals with AS (40% of their 
sample) with an extreme attentional bias to loss.   Such a bias, if present, may account 
for the decision-related anxiety reported by some people with ASD, since they may 
perceive their previous decision-making more negatively than the neurotypical 
population. 
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Studies using other laboratory tasks also indicate possible differences in the decision-
making of people with ASD compared to their neurotypical counterparts.  Minassian, 
Paulus, Lincoln et al. (2007) found similar flexibility in the decision-making of adults 
with ASD compared to a neurotypical comparison group on a two-choice prediction 
task with a covertly manipulated error rate: both groups demonstrated a ‘win-stay/lose-
shift’ strategy.  However, unlike the neurotypical participants, the participants with 
ASD demonstrated a more pronounced ‘win-stay/lose-shift’ strategy when the error-rate 
was low.  This suggests that people with ASD may be influenced to a greater extent by 
increases in the reinforcement schedule.  Similarly, Damiano, Aloi, Treadway et al. 
(2012) found that adults with ASD were prepared to expend more effort for monetary 
rewards than neurotypical participants on the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task 
(Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman et al., 2009), but demonstrated reduced sensitivity 
to the reward contingencies.  The authors related this to the high levels, among people 
with ASD, of circumscribed interests, often pursued at any cost. More broadly, it 
suggests that, in some contexts, people with ASD may be less flexible in their decision-
making. 
 
De Martino, Harrison, Knafo et al. (2008) have examined the effects of perceptual 
‘framing’ on monetary decisions.  The ‘framing effect’ describes the influence of the 
format in which the same options are presented (for example, by being worded in terms 
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of gains or losses) on choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  Compared to participants 
from the neurotypical population, adults with ASD demonstrated less susceptibility to 
the framing effect, making more logically consistent choices.  Furthermore, they did not 
demonstrate autonomic responses indicative of emotional involvement in the task.  De 
Martino and his colleagues proposed that ASD reduces the typical reliance on emotional 
information and enhances logical consistency. There have been similar findings in the 
area of moral/social judgments (Brewer, Catmur, Stovcos et al., 2015).  Such processing 
differences may affect many everyday situations because the available information is 
often ambiguous and/or incomplete (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymore et al., 2006). 
 
Finally, Brosnan, Chapman and Ashwin (2014) found that adolescents with ASD 
gathered more information prior to making a decision on the ‘Jumping-to-conclusions 
Beads Task”, than a neurotypical comparison group, and proposed that ASD may be 
associated with a circumspect reasoning bias, leading to more careful decision-making. 
Such a proposal is consistent with self-reported slowness in decision-making (Luke et 
al., 2012), which again may reflect a more cautious approach to seeking and collating 
information (Luke, 2011).  The results presented by DeMartino et al. (2008) and 
Brosnan et al., (2014) have recently been integrated to support a Dual Process Theory 
Account of ASD (Brosnan, Lewton and Ashwin, 2016).  This account is based on the 
dual processing theories in cognitive psychology (e.g. Kahneman, 2003), which propose 
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that humans have two cognitive systems for decision-making: i) an intuitive style that is 
rapid and automatic, and ii) a deliberative style that is slower and effortful.  In relating 
this account to people with ASD, Brosnan and his colleagues found, first, that increases 
in autistic traits in a general university undergraduate sample (assessed using the 
Autism Quotient, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright and Skinner et al., 2001) were associated 
with a bias towards deliberative reasoning (assessed using the Rational Experiential 
Inventory, Pacini and Epstein, 1999), and, secondly, that young men with ASD 
responded in a more deliberative and less intuitive manner than neurotypical peers on 
the Cognitive Reflection Task.     
 
The aim of this study was to examine empirically some of the possible ways in which 
decision-making may be different in ASD, when compared to the neurotypical 
population. This aim relates both to the earlier literature and to some of the difficulties 
reported in our previous study of self-reported experiences by people with ASD (Luke 
et al., 2012).  Specifically, we wished to investigate : i) the relative attention paid to 
negative and positive outcomes of previous choices, with a sample size large enough to 
detect the non-significant difference trend reported by Johnson et al. (2006); ii) 
flexibility in decision-making; iii) the latency of decision-making; and iv) the tendency 
to sample information. 
 
Page 7 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/autism
The Autism Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
8 
 
These processes were assessed using established laboratory tasks.  While many 
paradigms for studying decision-making have been developed, such as questionnaires 
(e.g. Scott and Bruce, 1995) and assessments of biases (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982), laboratory tasks can be used to present decisions visually, thereby 
reducing the requirement for imagination, which may be impaired in ASD (for example, 
Craig and Baron-Cohen, 1999), and provide objective measures of behaviour.  In 
addition, such tasks are often used to detect impairments in decision-making (see, for 
example, Bechara et al., 1999; Manes et al., 2002; Tchanturia, Liao, Uher et al., 2007).   
 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-eight adults with an ASD and forty neurotypical adults with no family history of 
ASD, aged 16 to 65 year took part; all participants gave written, informed consent prior 
to participation.  The diagnostic inclusion criteria were: 
1. Independent confirmation from a clinical or other relevant service of a diagnosis 
of an ASD, or diagnosis confirmed using the Autism Diagnostic Interview – 
Revised (ADI-R, Lord, Rutter and Le Couteur, 1994); and 
2. Scores on one of two additional screening measures, the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule Module 4, (ADOS, Lord, Rutter, Goode et al., 1989), 
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consistent with the clinical or ADI-R diagnosis.  If the clinical report lacked 
detail about the assessment procedure or did not report taking a developmental 
history (11 participants), inclusion criteria were scores on both the ADOS and 
AQ consistent with the clinical diagnosis. 
 
Using these criteria, 34 out of 38 participants had ASD diagnoses confirmed with either 
the ADI-R or the ADOS.  The remaining four participants were included because we 
received independent confirmation of their diagnosis from a clinical service describing a 
thorough assessment, and they scored above the clinical cut-off on the AQ.  Due to 
resource constraints we only conducted our own ADI in the absence of independent 
confirmation of diagnosis from a clinical service. In six cases, an ADI had recently 
carried out as part of another, unrelated, study by the same research group. 
 
Participants with ASD were recruited from volunteer databases and advertisements to 
members of autism support organisations.  Neurotypical participants were recruited via 
local advertisements and by word-of-mouth.  Recruitment and testing was carried out in 
2009.  Exclusion criteria for both groups were diagnoses of schizophrenia or related 
disorders, ADHD, bipolar depression, a tested Verbal IQ score below 90, significant 
and regular recreational drug use, and self-report of significant head trauma with lasting 
effects on cognition. The groups were matched for age, gender, and Verbal IQ (see 
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Table 1).  Verbal IQ was assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
– Revised (WASI, Wechsler, 1999).  All participants received payment as a token of 
appreciation.   
 
The target sample size was 45 participants in each group, which theoretically would 
have  detected a group difference on the computational model of the IGT of the same 
magnitude as that reported by Johnson et al. (2006) with almost 90% power at α = 0.1 
(one-tailed).  Unfortunately, it was not possible to recruit more than 38 adults with ASD 
in the time available. 
   
Measures 
Decision-making tasks. 
1.  Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, see Bechara et al., 1999), to assess relative attention to 
negative and positive outcomes of previous choices (study aim i).  In brief, participants 
are presented with a row of four decks of cards on a computer screen and asked to make 
repeated selections from the decks to win as much money as possible.  Successful 
performance depends upon learning to select the two decks covertly associated with 
long-term gain rather than the two associated with long-term loss (for deck 
contingencies, see Table 2).  To maintain motivation, participants were informed that 
they would receive an unspecified performance-related payment at the end of the task. 
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The study aimed to present 150 trials; however, due to a technical problem, data were 
available only from the first 115 trials. 
 
Data were analysed using the Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model (Busemeyer 
and Stout, 2002), which quantifies, as the dependent variable, the relative attention paid 
to wins and losses of previous choices (the motivation parameter). The attention weight 
parameter ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 characterising a decision-maker greatly 
attracted to wins and indifferent to losses, and 1 characterising a decision-maker with a 
strong aversion to loss.  Drawing on the findings of Johnson et al. (2006), we predicted 
that participants with ASD would demonstrate greater attention to negative outcomes, 
compared to the neurotypical participants. The proportion of advantageous selections 
over the task (task performance) is also reported.  
 
2.  Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT, Rogers, Everitt, Baldacchino et al., 1999), to assess 
flexibility (study aim ii) and latency (study aim iii) in decision-making.  In this task, 
flexibility is assessed as responsiveness to changes in probabilistic information; 
typically, participants will risk a greater proportion of points as the probability of 
success increases (see Sinz, Zamarian, Benke et al., 2008).  The CGT is part of the 
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Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB, for details see 
http://www.cambridgecognition.com/technology).  In brief, a row of 10 boxes is 
presented on a computer screen, with a ratio of red to blue boxes that differs on each 
trial (72 trials), ranging from 9:1 to 1:9.  Participants are told that the computer has 
hidden a token under one of the boxes and they are asked to guess the colour of the box 
that is hiding the token.  They are then asked to bet a proportion of their points on their 
choice being correct.  The optional bets are presented 2.5 seconds apart in ascending or 
descending order depending on the condition of the task.  The dependent variables are i) 
risk-taking, which is the mean proportion of points bet on each of the different trial 
types (i.e. ratio of blue to red) in each condition, and, when assessed across trial types, 
also provides an indication of flexibility in response to probabilistic information; and ii) 
deliberation time (latency), the time from presentation of the stimuli to the participant 
touching their chosen colour on the touch screen. We predicted that participants with 
ASD would demonstrate reduced flexibility and longer decision-making latencies, 
compared to the neurotypical participants. The proportion of trials on which participants 
choose the most likely colour (quality of decision-making) is also reported because it 
provides information about the extent to which they understand, and are engaged by, the 
task. 
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3.  Information Sampling Task (IST, Clark, Robbins, Ersche et al., 2006), to assess 
information sampling (study aim iv).  The IST is also part of the CANTAB.  In brief, a 
5x5 grid of 25 grey boxes on a computer-screen is presented, ‘behind’ each box is one 
of two hidden colours.  Participants are instructed to open (by pressing) a box to reveal 
its colour and to open as many boxes as they wish before deciding which of the two 
colours is in the majority.  Participants are presented with 10 trials in: i) a Fixed-Win 
condition, in which the total number of points available for a correct decision is 100, 
regardless of how many boxes are opened; and ii) a Decreasing-Win condition, in which 
the total number of points available for a correct decision starts at 250 and decreases by 
10 points with every box that is opened.  In both conditions, the cost of an incorrect 
decision is 100 points.  The dependent variable is mean ‘Probability Correct’ 
(P(Correct)),  the mean probability that the decision-made will be correct, given the 
information available at the time of the decision (for the calculation, see Clark et al., 
2006).  In general, P(Correct) increases as more information is sampled and is 
considered to be a more ecologically valid variable than the number of boxes opened.  
This is because, under certain circumstances, the mean number of boxes opened can 
provide only a limited index of the amount of information gathered (see Clark, Roiser, 
Robbins et al., 2009).  We predicted that, compared to the neurotypical group, the 
participants with ASD would sample information so as to increase the likelihood of 
making the correct decision. 
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Motor Speed. Motor speed on the touch screen computer was assessed using CANTAB 
Motor Screening Task (MOT). Participants used the tip of the forefinger of their 
dominant hand to touch 10 crosses as they appeared on the screen.  
 
Mood. Levels of anxiety and depression were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). 
 
The questionnaires, WASI, and the MOT were completed at the beginning of the testing 
session.  The order of the three decision-making tasks was counter-balanced across 
participants using a Latin Squares design to reduce potential order effects. 
  
Data analysis 
Prior to analysis, scores expressed as proportions of binomial events were transformed 
using the arcsine transformation, as recommended by Howell (1997).  Other data types 
were transformed to reduce skew and improve suitability for parametric analysis.   
Individual outliers (defined as more than three times the inter-quartile range from the 
upper or lower quartile after transformation) were excluded for parametric analyses.  
Data were analysed using repeated-measures ANOVA and t-tests.  Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were applied where the assumption of sphericity was not met.  Non-
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parametric equivalents to t-tests were used to compare data with distributions that 
remained non-normal after transformation.     
 
Levels of anxiety and depression (HADS scores) were statistically controlled for where 
there was a significant relationship with the dependent variable.  Such a relationship 
was assessed prior to analysis using: i) correlation analyses in the case of a single 
variable, and ii) including the measure as a covariate in the case of repeated measures 
ANOVA.    There was no relationship between levels of depression and the dependent 
variables.  However, there was a relationship between levels of anxiety and run lengths 
on the IGT and P(Correct) on the IST (described below). 
 
Of note, nine participants with an ASD and one participant were taking antidepressant 
or anxiolytic medication, which may have effects on decision-making similar to those 
described by Deakin, Aitken, Dowson et al. (2004a).  In the interests of caution, all 
analyses are carried out with and without these participants to check that their 
medications did not affect the results.  Changes to the results are reported separately 
from the main analysis.  Supplementary Table A presents descriptive information for 
the groups of participants not taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication.    
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Results 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
The participants with ASD reported significantly higher levels of anxiety and 
depression (see Table 1). 
 
Motor Screening Task 
The response latencies did not differ between the groups (MASD=861.1 msec, SD=249.3; 
Mneurotypical=853.6 msec, SD=187.2, t(76)=0.151, p=.881).  
  
Iowa Gambling Task 
Three participants in the neurotypical group were excluded because they responded 
abnormally; these participants made over eighty consecutive selections from one deck 
before sampling the other decks. 
 
Task performance. The proportion of advantageous choices for each consecutive block 
of twenty-three selections is shown in Figure 1.  The transformed proportions were 
analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA of Block × Group (nASD=38, 
nneurotypical=37).  There was a main effect of Block (F(3.46, 252)=26.7, p<.001), Group 
(F(1, 73)=4.49, p=.037), and a Block × Group interaction (F(3.46, 252)=4.44, p=.003).  
A simple-effects analysis revealed that the interaction was due to a greater number of 
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selections from the advantageous decks by the ASD group in the final block of trials 
(F(1, 73)=9.01, p=.004). 
 
EVL parameter. The fit of the EVL model was evaluated using the procedure described 
by Johnson et al. (2006). The fit of the model was satisfactory: the EVL model provided 
a better fit than the control (Bernoulli) model for 80% of the participants.  The mean 
parameter estimate for attention to loss (range: 0 to 1, where 1 reflects high attention to 
loss) did not differ between the groups (MASD=0.43, SD=0.27; Mneurotypical=0.48, 
SD=0.28, t(73)=-0.739, p=.462).  In contrast to Johnson et al. (2006), there was no 
evidence that a sub-group of participants with ASD demonstrated an extreme attentional 
bias to loss (four participants with ASD and five neurotypical participants had 
parameter estimates of 1).  
 
The participants with ASD made significantly longer stretches of consecutive choices 
from the advantageous decks; these data were log transformed to reduce skew and 
included anxiety as a covariate (Mean maximum run length on the advantageous decks: 
MASD= 29.6, SD=27.2; Mneurotypical=12.1, SD=16.2, F(1,72)=7.246, p=.009). 
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Cambridge Gamble Task 
Quality of decision-making. Compared to the neurotypical group, the most logical 
choice was selected by the participants with ASD on a smaller proportion of trials 
(MASD=0.96, SD=0.068; Mneurotypical=0.98, SD=0.087, Mann-Whitney U test, p=.022). 
 
Exclusion of participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication 
Following exclusion of the 10 participants taking the antidepressant and anxiolytic 
medications, this difference between the groups was no longer statistically significant 
(nASD=29, nneurotypical=39, MASD=0.97, SD=0.012; Mneurotypical=0.98, SD=0.014, Mann-
Whitney U test, p=.216).  
 
Flexibility. The proportion of points risked (see Figure 2) were arcsine transformed and 
analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA of Trial type (9:1, 8:2, 7:3, 6:4, 5:5) × 
Group.  The groups did not differ in the proportion of points bet on the task (risk-
taking), F(1, 76)=1.407, p=.239).  Moreover, the Trial type × Group interaction was not 
significant (F(1.690, 128.429)=0.052, p=.926), indicating that both groups flexibly 
adjusted their choices in response to changes in the probabilistic information. 
 
Latency. Deliberation times (see Figure 3) were reciprocally transformed to reduce 
skew and analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA of Trial type × Group.  
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Compared to the neurotypical group, the participants with ASD took longer to make the 
decisions (F(1, 76)=8.18, p=.005).  The Trial type × Group interaction was not 
significant (F(2.744, 208.567)=1.654, p=.182).   
 
Information Sampling Task 
The mean P(Correct) scores (see Figure 4) were arcsine transformed and analysed using 
a repeated-measures ANOVA of Condition (Fixed Win, Decreasing Win) × Group 
(nASD=38, nNeurotypical=40).  There was no effect of Group (F(1, 76)=1.736, p=.0.192) or 
Condition × Group interaction (F(1, 76)=0.273, p=.603).   
 
Exclusion of participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication 
One participant in the neurotypical group was an outlier in the Decreasing Win 
condition and excluded from the analysis (nASD=29, nneurotypical=38).  There was a 
significant effect of anxiety when assessed using repeated measures ANCOVA (F(1, 
64)=5.510, p=0.022), which appeared to reflect a non-significant, but negative 
correlation between anxiety and the dependent variables; anxiety was therefore included 
as a covariate in the between-group analysis.  There was main effect of Group (F(1, 
64)=9.713, p=.003), suggesting that the participants with ASD sampled information to a 
higher probability of being correct than the neurotypical group. 
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Discussion   
This paper reports an empirical investigation of several decision-making processes in 
intellectually able adults with ASD to complement previous subjective reports of 
difficulties: decision-making performance, attention to negative and positive outcomes, 
flexibility to changes in probabilistic information, speed of decision-making, and 
information sampling.  These processes were assessed to establish whether some of the 
experiences reported by adults with ASD are consistent with any differences in 
decision-making processes measured on laboratory tasks.   
 
Compared to the neurotypical participants, the participants with ASD demonstrated 
significantly longer decision-making latencies on the CGT, and, a tendency to make 
decisions with a higher probability of being correct on the IST.  These findings are 
consistent with self-reports of a tendency to spend excessive time collecting and 
collating information (Luke, 2011), reaching a decision (Luke et al., 2012; Winter, 
2003) and indecisiveness (Johnson et al., 2006). Longer deliberation times did not 
appear to reflect impairments in motor speed, and are consistent with previous research 
demonstrating reduced response speed to comprehension questions in ASD (Bowler, 
1997).  It is, of course, possible that the increased latency reflects slower perceptual 
processing of the number of coloured boxes.  However, this interpretation is not 
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supported by a previous study demonstrating comparable inspection times between 
children with and without ASD (Wallace, Anderson and Happé, 2009). 
 
The tendency for participants with ASD to sample more information than the 
neurotypical participants on the IST is consistent with the report by Brosnan et al. 
(2014) that adolescents with ASD sampled more information prior to deciding from 
which jar a coloured bead may have been drawn. This was formulated as a ‘circumspect 
reasoning bias’.  We support this formulation by demonstrating that participants with 
ASD sampled more information ven when penalised for doing so (in this case, by a 
loss of points in the Decreasing Win condition, in which participants lost 10 points for 
every box sampled). 
   
Contrary to the findings of Johnson et al. (2006), the EVL model analysis of the IGT 
data did not suggest that participants with ASD were more attentive than the 
neurotypical participants to negative rather than positive outcomes of previous choices.  
Moreover, there was no evidence of a sub-group of participants with ASD with an 
extreme attentional bias to loss. The differences between our findings and those of the 
previous study  may reflect: i) the difference in ages of the sample populations 
(adolescents in Johnson et al., 2006)), since decision-making is affected by age (see 
Deakin, Aitken, Robbins et al., 2004b); ii) a poorer fit of the EVL model (a satisfactory 
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fit for only 55% of participants in Johnson et al. (2006), compared to 80% in the present 
study); and iii) the difference in the study sample sizes (15 AS participants in Johnson et 
al., 2006).  Overall, the findings from the present study suggest the difficulties reported 
by people with ASD, such as anxiety about decision-making, are not accounted for by 
increased attention to negative outcomes of previous decisions.   
 
Of interest, however, compared to the neurotypical participants, the participants with 
ASD made more advantageous choices on the IGT.  This finding, again, differs from the 
results of Johnson et al. (2006), and from other researchers who have used the IGT 
(Yechiam et al., 2010, Faja et al., 2013, and Mussey et al., 2015.  However, our findings  
are, consistent with those reported by South et al. (2014).  Given that all the above 
studies involved children or adolescents of at least average intellectual ability, it is 
possible that the apparent discrepancy between different studies reflects sample size, 
since the largest samples were those of the present study (n=38) and South et al. (n=48). 
Adding weight to the results of South et al. (2014),  our findings extend the age range 
for which superior performance on the IGT in ASD has been demonstrated. 
 
We were surprised that, on the IGT, three of the neurotypical participants made over 
eighty selections from a single deck before sampling from the other decks.  This was 
one of the advantageous decks. It is possible, though unlikely, that these participants 
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had previous experience of the task, though they did not volunteer any relevant 
information.  More plausibly, perhaps, their response reflected limited engagement and 
boredom with the task.  No participants with ASD appeared to respond abnormally and 
they all sampled each of the decks.  The tendency for the superior performance of those 
with ASD (characterised by more consistent advantageous selections in the later stages 
of the task) may reflect speedier comprehension of the contingencies associated with 
long-term gains, and/or greater ability to focus on maintaining a more repetitive but 
logically advantageous strategy.      
 
The tendency for participants with ASD to make more advantageous selections on the 
IGT is consistent with subjective and experimental reports of enhanced logic in 
decision-making in ASD (De Martino et al., 2008; Luke et al., 2012), as well as the 
superior systemising hypothesis of ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2009).  Moreover, a tendency 
to attempt a more logical analysis of decisions, which demand time and cognitive 
resources, could account for the perception of ‘effortful’ processing reported by people 
with ASD (Luke et al., 2012).   
 
The other decision-making processes assessed (attention to negative and positive 
outcomes, and flexibility) did not differ between the groups.  One possible explanation, 
though it cannot easily be reconciled with our positive findings on other tasks, is that 
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they may reflect the difference between the laboratory tasks, which present simple 
decisions in controlled and quiet surroundings that are likely to enable participants with 
ASD to perform at their best, and decisions in real life, which may involve multiple 
response options, busy environments, be of personal significance, and often have to be 
made under pressure of time (c.f. Sainsbury’s (2000) description of the difficulty in in 
choosing food “on the spot” was given in the context of the lunch queue in a school 
canteen, p101).   
 
Overall, the profile of results obs rved in this study (slower, logical and perhaps more 
effortful decision-making, with non-significant differences for attention to positive and 
negative outcomes) seems to support a Dual Process Theory Account of ASD (Brosnan 
et al., 2016).  Specifically, this account suggests that ASD is associated with a 
consistent bias towards slower, deliberative decision-making and away from intuitive 
decision-making.  While such a reasoning style may be beneficial for some tasks (e.g. 
mathematics), it may contribute to the characteristic difficulty in social communication 
in ASD, which requires the rapid integration of social and, often, contextual 
information.     
 
Levels of anxiety, assessed using the HADS, appeared to affect the results for two of the 
measures in the present study.  First, we found that anxiety correlated positively with 
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longer stretches of consecutively advantageous choices; this suggests that higher levels 
of anxiety in the ASD group may contribute to the observed group effect.  Previous 
research findings regarding the relationship between anxiety and IGT performance are 
mixed (see, for example Miu et al., 2008; Werner, Duschek and Schandry, 2009). 
However, the relationship we observed is consistent with studies suggesting that higher 
levels of trait anxiety are associated with reduced risk-taking choices (Giorgetta, 
Grecucci, Zuanon et al., 2012).  Secondly, there was a significant effect of anxiety on 
P(Correct) on the IST.  Interestingly, for this analysis, the group difference found on the 
IST appeared to be moderated by anxiety: higher levels of anxiety were weakly 
associated with reduced information sampling. A similar effect has been observed in 
neurotypical participants with experimentally-induced anxiety, who tended to ‘jump to 
conclusions’ when completing the beads task (Lincoln, Lange, Burau et al., 2010).  In 
noting this, however, we concur with Lincoln and her colleagues that there may be 
significant individual variation in the impact of anxiety on reasoning styles.      
 
This study has limitations.  As discussed above, the finding that the participants with 
ASD took longer to make decisions on the CGT may reflect an overall weakness in 
cognitive speed, rather than processes involved specifically in decision-making.  
Inclusion of a measure of general cognitive processing speed would have provided an 
opportunity to identify, and control for, any differences in cognitive speed between the 
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groups.  In addition, although the decision-making tasks used have been established to 
identify cognitive differences between clinical groups, they clearly lack ecological 
validity, both in their content and the laboratory conditions in which they are carried 
out.  Moreover, the tasks did not include elements of social decision-making, which is 
proving to be an area of direct relevance in ASD (for example, Brewer et al., 2015). 
 
In addition, the age range of the participants was rather wide.  Since age is an important 
factor in decision-making (Deakin, Aitken, Robbins et al., 2004), the statistical analyses 
may have been more powerful in a narrower age range of participants.  However, the 
groups did not significantly in mean age or in the distribution of age.  While inclusion 
of age as a covariate might be possible, it was not included here because statistical 
control of a confounding variable is necessary only when the confounding variable 
differs between the independent variables (Boniface, 1995). In this case, the influence 
of age was removed optimally at the design stage. 
 
Research implications 
Given the diverse findings on the IGT between different studies, further research aiming 
to understand these differences is desirable.  In addition, the relationship between 
anxiety and decision-making appears to be complicated, depending upon the decision-
making context, and potentially the individual characteristics of the decision-maker.  
Page 26 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/autism
The Autism Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
27 
 
Given the importance of anxiety in the lives of both children and adults with the 
condition (Kim et al., 2000; Skokouskas & Gallagher, 2010), such studies are rather 
urgently required. More generally, future studies relating to decision-making should 
consider assessing decision-making in ASD using both tasks and contexts with greater 
ecological validity.  A starting point for such research could be the adaptation of the 
paradigms developed by Braeutigam and  his colleagues (Ambler, Braeutigam, Stins et 
al., 2004; Braeutigam, Stins, Rose et al., 2001).  Their tasks involve shopping decisions 
(a class of decision that was identified as problematic in several of the survey accounts) 
and have enabled identification of several neural processes involved in decision-
making, such as silent vocalisation and the effect of familiarity on choice.  Other 
paradigms could be developed that present medical and other legally-significant 
decisions, or decisions with several stages, such as planning a journey.  The 
development of such tasks may promote investigations of the difficulties reported by 
people with ASD that can more easily be linked to support for individuals with ASD 
and their care-givers.  
 
Practical implications 
Despite the limitations of the study, the findings from this substantial sample of people 
with ASD demonstrate that, under experimental conditions, performance on tasks 
involving the decision-making processes of quality/logic (IGT) and flexibility (CGT) is 
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not impaired and indeed, can be of comparable, or even superior, quality to that of 
neurotypical adults. Unfortunately, the experiences of everyday decision-making by 
people with ASD remain negative (Luke et al., 2012). Previously, we made a number of 
recommendations intended to improve their experiences, for example, that 
encouragement and reassurance were needed to challenge the usual self-perceptions of 
decision-making of our respondents, and, as far as possible, that time-constraints should 
be relaxed to minimise feelings of pressure to make a choice. The findings of this study 
provide some empirical basis for these recommendations. For example, the evidence 
that, even for the very straightforward  task involving simple probability (the CGT), and 
under favourable laboratory conditions, participants with ASD needed longer to 
deliberate before making a choice supports our recommendation that people with the 
condition should not feel rushed into making decisions. This is particularly important 
where the decision is legally-significant or potentially life-changing (for example, 
whether to give or withhold consent to a complex medical procedure or a change of 
accommodation).   Similarly, the enhanced information-sampling demonstrated by our 
ASD participants on a visual task (the IST) supports our previous recommendation 
about minimizing information that is irrelevant to the decision to be made. The 
provision of relevant material, clearly set out, may assist people with ASD to focus on 
the analytical part of the process, which appears to be a strength associated with the 
condition, without becoming distracted, and  overwhelmed by, collecting  more and 
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more information.  .  Finally, given that the majority of ASD participants in this study 
had levels of anxiety above the normal range, consideration should be given to the 
possible effects of anxiety on their decision-making; access to psychological or 
pharmacological therapies to reduce anxiety may also be beneficial.   
 
Our recommendations in relation to supporting decision-making remain general: the 
range of responses of the participants with ASD emphasises the need to provide 
practical support based on individuals’ assessed strengths and weaknesses. 
Nevertheless, since they are evid nce-based, these recommendations may be of 
assistance in providing guidance to supplement the recent, and very welcome, attempts 
to create ‘autism-friendly’ social (https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-
network/2016/jun/10/no-silence-plea) and physical 
(http://www.scottishautism.org/about-autism/research-and-training/design-autism) 
environments.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings indicate that adults with ASD can, at least in laboratory situations 
circumstances, make as good or overall better decisions than adults in the general 
population.  However, consistent with the subjective decision-making difficulties 
reported, we found that, compared to a neurotypical comparison group, this sample of 
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intellectually able adults with ASD demonstrated slower decision-making speed, a 
tendency to sample more information prior to making decisions (consistent with the 
circumspect reasoning bias hypothesis), and more logical choices, perhaps reflecting 
more effortful processing.  These findings provide an empirical basis for our previous 
recommendations about supporting decision-making by people with ASD (Luke et al. 
2012).  
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Table 1.  Participant characteristics 
Characteristic  
ASD group 
(n = 38) 
Control Group 
(n = 40) 
Test of group difference 
% male 65.8 67.5 χ
2
=0.03, p=0.87 
Mean age in years 34.1 (15.4) 34.0 (14.7) Mann-Whitney U, p=0.91 
Mean  tested Verbal IQ  116.4 (10.2) 114.2 (11.9) t(76)=0.89, p=0.38 
HADS: Anxiety  10.6 (3.6) 5.4 (2.7) t(76)=7.27, p<0.001 
HADS: Depression 4.7 (3.2) 1.6 (1.6) Mann-Whitney U, p<0.001 
 
Table 1 shows a summary of the characteristics of both groups.  Mean (SD).  These results did not 
change when the participants taking the antidepressant or anxiolytic medication were excluded.  
HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. 
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Table 2.  Contingency scheme for the IGT (as used by Bechara et al. 1994) 
Deck Win Lose 
Net profit over 
10 trials 
A 
$50 every card 
$50 with probability 1⁄2 
+$250 
B $250 with probability 1⁄10 
C 
$100 every card 
$150, 200, 250, 300 or 350 each with probability 1⁄10 
-$250 
D $1250 with probability 1⁄10 
 
 
Page 41 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/autism
The Autism Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Figure 1.  Performance on the IGT for each group of participants 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean proportion of choices from the advantageous decks for each consecutive 
block of 23 selections for both groups of participants.  Error bars represent the standard error of the 
mean. 
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Figure 2.  Mean proportion of points bet across different trial types of the CGT 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the mean proportion of points bet on the different trial types of the CGT (averaged across 
condition) for both groups of participants.  Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.   
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Figure 3.  Mean deliberation times for each group of participants on the CGT  
 
 
Figure 3 shows the mean deliberation times for both groups of participants on all trial types of the CGT.  Error 
bars represent one standard error of the mean.   
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Figure 4.  The mean P(Correct) scores for each group of participants on the IST  
 
 
Figure 4 shows the raw mean P(Correct) scores for both groups of participants who were not taking 
antidepressant or anxiolyitc medication.  P(Correct) is the probability that the participants’ choice 
would have been correct at the time of the decision, based on the information available.  Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean.  
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Table A.  Participant characteristics (excluding participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic 
medication) 
Characteristic  
ASD group 
(n = 38) 
Control Group 
(n = 40) 
Test of group difference 
% male 62.1 69.2 χ
2
=0.38, p=0.54 
Mean age in years 30.7 (14.0) 34.2 (14.9) Mann-Whitney U, p=0.24 
Mean tested Verbal IQ  116.7 (11.0) 114.1 (12.0) t(66)=0.90, p=0.37 
HADS: Anxiety  10.3 (356) 5.3 (2.7) t(66)=6.74, p<0.001 
HADS: Depression 4.1 (2.7) 1.6 (1.6) Mann-Whitney U, p<0.001 
 
Table 2 shows a summary of the characteristics of both groups, excluding participants taking the 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication.  Mean (SD).  HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale. 
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